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Abstract
This is the editor’s introduction to the book symposium on Jason 
Stanley’s influential book How Propaganda Words (Oxford University 
Press, 2015). After a few brief remarks situating the book in the 
landscape of current analytic philosophy, I offer a detailed presentation 
of each chapter of the book, in order to familiarize the reader with its 
main tenets and with the author’s argumentative strategy. I flag the 
issues that the contributors to the symposium discuss, and describe 
their main points. I end with expressing hope that the symposium will 
help continue the conversation around ideology and propaganda within 
analytic philosophy.
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The United States of America is considered a liberal democracy—
that is, a society that values liberty and whose deliberative process 
presupposes reasonableness. Yet, many pronouncements by politi-
cians or the media have been taken to be propagandistic: those instill-
ing fear of immigrants in the population, those painting exclusively 
negative portrayals of certain racial or religious groups, those decry-
ing the destruction of “the American dream” etc. Similar tropes have 
been used in many other countries considered to be liberal democra-
cies. How propaganda is possible in a liberal democracy, what forms 
it takes, what are its dangers for the democratic process and how it 
can be counterbalanced are the central questions of Jason Stanley’s 
book How Propaganda Works.
Analytic philosophy has been often accused of dealing with ab-
stract matters that find little application to social issues. While 
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maybe true at certain times in its history, and for certain areas more 
than for others, this perception is clearly false when it comes to the 
topics analytic philosophy addresses today. Arguably, such topics still 
constitute a niche (or, better, several niches) rather than belonging to 
the mainstream, but they are on solid footing. By bringing tools from 
philosophy of language and epistemology to bear on social issues like 
ideology and propaganda, Stanley’s book contributes to propelling 
this tendency within analytic philosophy into the mainstream, in an 
effort both to expand the latter’s range and show its fruitfulness.
Since its appearance in 2015, How Propaganda Works has received 
quite a lot of attention, both within and outside analytic circles. 
Numerous reviews have been written, public intellectuals have 
expressed their opinions and several book symposia have been 
published by leading journals both in philosophy and political theory 
(Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Theoria, Global Discourse). 
The present symposium follows suit, featuring three papers that 
engage with various issues from the book, together with Stanley’s 
replies. In this short introduction, I offer a chapter-by-chapter 
description of Stanley’s book as a reminder for the reader of its main 
tenets. I flag the issues that are discussed by the contributors, and 
briefly describe their main points. I leave the reader the pleasure of 
discovering Stanley’s replies to the contributors’ objections.
In “The Problem of Propaganda”, the introduction of the book, 
Stanley situates his endeavor in the realm of “political rhetoric”—
a topic that has preoccupied philosophers since Plato and Aristotle, 
and clarifies that it is not a manual of propaganda, but an attempt to 
understand it and the mechanisms that make it effective. Thus, he 
starts off with Victor Klemperer’s description in his book Language 
of the Third Reich (Klemperer 2006) of the effects of Nazi propaganda 
and its reliance on emotions-laden terms such as “heroism”. Accord-
ing to Klemperer, the images and emotions that such terms conjure 
simply make rational deliberation impossible. Since rational delib-
eration is crucial in a democracy, the danger posed by propaganda 
for democracy is easy to see. Importantly, the claim that propaganda 
is dangerous for democracy holds across various ways of conceiving 
the latter. The essential connection that Stanley brings out in the 
introduction is that between propaganda and (flawed) ideology, and 
he lays down the challenges a theory of each faces: those facing the 
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former are explaining its nature and effectiveness, while that facing 
the latter is to explain “voluntary servitude”, in the words of Étienne 
de La Boétie (La Boétie 2012)—the tendency of negatively privileged 
groups to accept the flawed ideology of the elites. Finally, he asks the 
question of whether currently there are democracies where propa-
ganda is present. Stanley’s answer is an emphatic “yes”, and he takes 
his main illustration to be the United States of America. The chapter 
ends with various examples in which a democratic language is used in 
the United States of America to mask an undemocratic reality.
Chapter 1, named “Propaganda in the History of Political 
Thought”, is an incursion into the history of propaganda, with fo-
cus on the argument(s) that propaganda can be perilous for democ-
racy. Thus, Stanley reviews arguments by Plato, Aristotle, Rous-
seau, Charles Mills and others to the effect that exercising the most 
central expression of the main democratic value—liberty (in the 
form of freedom of speech)—makes liberal democracy unstable. He 
also notes that recently this worry has not been present in politi-
cal theorizing and connects this neglect with the way in which the 
relationship between normative and applied political philosophy is 
conceived. The main difference between the two is that, while the 
former studies democratic regimes as ideals or idealizations, the latter 
is left to deal with the “impurity” of actual democratic systems. But, 
closely following Mills 1997, 2005, Stanley claims that this way of 
understanding their relation misses the historical centrality of the 
problem and ends up ignoring “actual historic oppression and its 
legacy in the present, or current ongoing oppression” (Mills 2005: 
168). Finally, drawing on several classical distinctions, and relying 
on a negative conception of liberty, Stanley concludes that the way to 
approach the problem is by taking silencing speech (in the sense theo-
rized by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton in Hornsby and Langton 
1998) as the main way of restricting free speech rights. Since silenc-
ing speech is propagandistic, understanding it (and thus, the threat it 
poses to liberal democracy) requires an analysis of propaganda.
Chapter 2, “Propaganda Defined”, is where Stanley starts this 
analytic enterprise, by arguing against two entrenched ways of con-
struing propaganda to arrive at the definition he favors. Against the 
thesis that propaganda necessarily involves false claims (“the falsity 
condition”), Stanley provides both counterexamples (the sentence 
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“There are Muslims among us” (2015: 42) is strictly speaking true, 
even when used in a propagandistic manner to instill fear of Muslims) 
and arguments meant to deflate the rejoinder that the false claims are 
not expressed, but communicated (misleading, for example, need not 
communicate false claims, yet it could count as propaganda). Stan-
ley’s main objection against the claim that propaganda consists of 
insincere claims (“the insincerity condition”) is that it obscures the 
deep connections between propaganda and flawed ideological belief, 
the latter being investigated in full detail in chapters 5 and 6.
After telling us what he doesn’t take propaganda to be, Stan-
ley puts forward his own positive conception. Its main ingredients 
are that propaganda aims to cut off rational debate by appealing to 
people’s affective states and that it exploits an ideal. With these ele-
ments at hand, Stanley differentiates between supporting and under-
mining propaganda, the former defined as “[a] contribution to public 
discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet 
is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideas 
by either emotional or other nonrational means” (2015: 53), the lat-
ter as a contribution that tends to “erode those very ideals” (2015: 
53). Plenty of examples are given in the chapter, of both types. Fur-
ther narrowing down the analysis, Stanley focuses on undermining 
propaganda in relation to political ideals—that is, undermining dema-
goguery, defined in concordance with the above as “[a] contribution 
to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of a worthy 
political, economic or rational ideal, but is in the service of a goal 
that tends to undermine that very ideal” (2015: 69). Finally, Stanley 
considers several objections to this account of propaganda: that it is 
not politically useful, that it presupposes a neutral stance or that it is 
circular. In relation to the first (paralleling a similar objection raised 
for Sally Haslanger’s account of oppression, developed in Haslanger 
2012a), for example, talking about “worthy” political ideals intro-
duces a certain degree of relativity, which leads to the complaint that 
the account falls short of giving clear verdicts on what counts as pro-
paganda and what doesn’t. Stanley’s answer (following Haslanger’s) 
is that the project here is to provide a metaphysics of propaganda, and 
not an epistemic criterion for recognizing it as such (thus leaving 
it open that some forms of propaganda will never be recognized 
as such). This is enough to allow one to expose certain arguments, 
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insofar as they erode the ideals they are meant to serve, as propa-
gandistic. The chapter ends with a few examples of non-demagogic 
propaganda—supporting propaganda in service of a worthy political 
ideal (e.g., stressing the physical beauty of one’s country in order to 
motivate protecting its natural resources).
One of the issues tackled by Bianca Cepollaro and Giuliano 
Torrengo’s paper, entitled “The Best and the Worst of Propaganda”, 
is that of the definition of propaganda—namely, as essentially 
involving the use of emotion (see the first definition in the paragraph 
above). Contra that claim, the two authors make the point that 
there are cases that are rightfully catalogued as positive supporting 
propaganda, yet no appeal to emotion is present. As the main 
example to buttress their claim, they offer the (widespread) use of 
the feminine pronoun “she” in academic writing, which they take to 
amount to a form of affirmative action that thwarts the expectation 
that protagonists are always men and thus aimed at counterbalancing 
the unequal and unjust representation of women.
Chapter 3 (“Propaganda in Liberal Democracy”) brings the focus 
on liberal democracies, Stanley’s main interest in connection to the 
phenomenon considered. To apply the notion of propaganda to lib-
eral democracies, we need to get clear on what their political ideals 
are (that is, we need to engage in normative political theory). Stanley 
notes that one type of such ideals are those governing public political 
discourse, a discourse that appears in political debate in elections, 
among representatives that seek to pass legislature in the chambers of 
government and in media discussions of both. Those ideals pertain to 
the ideals of public reason (analyzed by John Rawls in Rawls 2005, for 
example), which are the standards that ought to guide public politi-
cal discourse, and which imply (at the minimum) fair deliberation 
and equal representation of all citizens. The main question here is 
what makes a deliberative joint process fair. Thus, Stanley investi-
gates three normative ideals of public political discourse: theoretical 
rationality, practical rationality, and reasonableness. Ultimately, Stan-
ley settles for the latter, which is conceived by Rawls as requiring 
from any contribution to political discussion to be justifiable to all 
those it concerns. Reasonableness involves, according to W. E. B. 
Du Bois (1994), Susan Stebbing (1939), Manfred Stanley (1983) and 
Stephen Darwall (2006), all of whom Stanley follows here, cognitive 
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empathy—the capacity to put oneself in others’ shoes and of treating 
them with dignity and respect. Paradigmatic cases of propaganda, 
then, are “ones that are presented as reasonable, but that subsequent-
ly make it more difficult for the participants in the debate to be rea-
sonable” (2015: 108); in other words, they erode reasonableness.
In the second part of the chapter, Stanley shows, taking as a start-
ing point the traditional notion of “defending rhetoric”, that pro-
paganda can play a positive role—that is, that it can take the form 
of civic rhetoric, whose use is politically necessary “to overcome fun-
damental obstacles to the realization of democratic ideals” (2015: 
109–10). His main example is the debate between W. E. B. Du Bois 
and Alain Locke in the 1920s about the usefulness of using propa-
ganda by Black artists to transmit the message that Blacks deserve 
equal respect as humans and citizens. As for the method by which 
civic rhetoric operates, Stanley submits that it is by employing the 
liberal democratic ideals themselves (in the case of Du Bois 1926, 
freedom) against a certain (limited) understanding of them and in 
order to expand their range to those previously left outside their 
purview. Civil rhetoric thus sits in stark contrast to demagoguery: 
one increases reasonableness, the other erodes it. The parallel analy-
sis of the two completes the picture of the main forms of propaganda 
found in (faulty) liberal democracies.
In “Language as a Mechanism of Control”, the fourth chapter of 
the book, Stanley deploys known tools from analytic philosophy of 
language to paint a comprehensive picture of how propaganda works. 
To this aim, Stanley exploits a truth-conditional theory of meaning 
and takes the fact that it explains successful communication to make 
it suitable to provide a grasp of what happens when communication 
fails, as in propagandistic manipulation. The starting point of the 
analysis is the idea, proposed by various philosophers in the feminist 
tradition (e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Jennifer Hornsby, Rae Lang-
ton) that certain types of speech have the function of subordinating 
certain groups. Focusing on linguistic propaganda (as opposed to im-
agistic and other of its forms), Stanley introduces a number of famil-
iar concepts from current philosophy of language and shows how 
they come together to achieve his purpose: linguistic context (a notion 
central in contemporary semantics and pragmatics), common ground 
(a notion introduced by Robert Stalnaker and discussed in detail in, 
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e.g., Stalnaker 2002), ranking (a development of the Stalnakerian no-
tion of common ground by Frank Veltman (1996) and William Starr 
(forthcoming), and applied to subordinating speech by Ishani Maitra 
(2012)), social meaning (Dan Kahan’s term from Kahan 1997). Im-
portantly, two types of content are distinguished in this framework: 
at-issue content and not-at-issue content. The former is what one pro-
poses to add to the common ground (what is taken to be commonly 
accepted by interlocutors), and can be easily rejected; the latter is 
what is not openly proposed, but rather smuggled into the common 
ground, and is much harder (or in some cases impossible without 
breaking the conversation) to reject.
Here, at this second level of content, is where propaganda thrives. 
Words have social meanings, which can amount to contents like ste-
reotypes, but can also be commands or instructions to prefer certain 
situations over others (via the ranking mentioned above). By repeated 
association of a word with a certain social meaning, the latter becomes 
encoded in the word’s conventional meaning, and thus gets communi-
cated when the word is employed. Social meanings appear at the level 
of not-at-issue content, and they serve to stifle political deliberation 
by eroding empathy or by excluding the perspective of certain groups. 
Stanley discusses two ways in which propagandistic effects can be 
achieved: according to what he calls “the content model”, the at-issue 
content is reasonable, but the not-at-issue content is unreasonable; ac-
cording to what he calls “the expressive model”, the at-issue content is 
reasonable, but the words used have not-at-issue emotional effects. Since 
both erode empathy and aim to exclude the perspective of certain 
groups, both models are fit for the analysis of propaganda (Stanley 
himself holds a disjunctive view). One of Stanley’s examples to illus-
trate this mechanism is the term “welfare”: it can be used to convey a 
content that makes a reasonable claim (say, a preoccupation with the 
wellbeing of citizens) but at the same time conveys its social mean-
ing—the content that Blacks are lazy, for example, or an emotional 
effect that evinces the desire to avoid Blacks. Interestingly, Stanley 
connects the discussion of such “code words” with that of slurs and 
draws certain methodological consequences for the way philosophy 
of language has approached them. Noting that, precisely because of 
their openly derogatory character, slurs have become unacceptable in 
the public discourse of contemporary democratic societies, Stanley 
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claims that the recent focus on slurs, as a special type of expressions, 
is misguided. While both slurs and code words encode social mean-
ings that exclude certain groups from public deliberation (thus having 
the same function in discourse), it is the latter that are more important 
to study, since they are the ones mostly used in propagandistic ma-
nipulation. Stanley also briefly notes that there are other mechanisms 
for achieving propagandistic effects, different from the one described 
in detail in the chapter. Thus, restricting the domain of quantifiers 
like “everyone”, the strategic use of personal pronouns like “we”, even 
names (a telling example being Klemperer’s discussion of German 
names under the Third Reich) can exclude certain individuals from a 
group, divide people in opposite groups (us and them), signal that one 
is a part of a group by bearing the “right” name etc. The last part of 
the chapter is dedicated to tackling various issues that arise once we 
acknowledge that communication is so often indirect and complex—
the most important being that about the role and possibility of norms 
of public reason in a democracy. After mentioning and rejecting John 
Dewey’s notion of “regulative ideal” (proposed in Dewey 1954), the 
related notion of “faith in the democratic process”, and an analogy 
with ideals in science, Stanley eventually settles on adopting “system-
atic openness to the possibility that one has been unknowingly swayed 
by bias” (2015: 176) as a viable norm.
It is issues from this chapter that Olúfémi O. Táíwò’s contri-
bution, entitled “The Empire Has No Clothes”, chiefly addresses. 
Táíwò’s main aim in the paper is to propose what he calls a “practice 
first” view of propaganda, which he sees as opposed to the common 
notion (adopted by Stanley, too) that gives beliefs the primary role. 
Táíwò objects to Stanley’s dichotomy between at-issue and not-at-
issue content and to his understanding of common ground. He thus 
proposes a supplementation of the latter in order to include non-
doxastic elements, such as warrants and incentives, which are social 
in nature and are essentially connected with social behavior. This is 
what Táíwò calls “agenda setting”, understood as effecting changes to 
the common ground’s associated incentive structure. Agenda setting, 
however, extends well beyond conversational practices into non-con-
versational phenomena like “rent prices, unemployment rates, and 
terrorism” and thus provides a unified analysis of what only appear 
to be disparate phenomena while preserving the predictive capacity 
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of belief-based views. Táíwò also draws out the possible advantages 
the practice first view has in connection to other issues in social and 
political philosophy, brought to the fore, for example, by Miranda 
Fricker’s concept of “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007) or Charles 
Mills’ analysis of “white ignorance” (Mills 2007).
The second point of Cepollaro and Torrengo’s contribution also 
tackles an issue that appears in this chapter—namely, Stanley’s claim 
that slurs are not special in comparison to other types of natural 
language expressions (in particular, code words). The two authors 
argue for the special character of slurs by contrasting them with code 
words: since there are cases in which the latter are used without 
their social meaning being communicated, but no cases in which the 
former are used without their social meaning being communicated, 
there is a crucial difference between the two types of expressions. 
This vindicates, in the authors’ view, the special treatment slurs have 
received in current literature.
Chapter 5 (“Ideology”) tackles the epistemological aspects of pro-
paganda, and Stanley’s aim in it is to spell out a politically significant 
way in which beliefs are resistant to evidence—a problem that has 
been at the center of the philosophy of, for example, David Hume. In 
A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume asked why is it that certain beliefs 
(e.g., the belief that there are external things) are so hard to revise 
in light of evidence and found the culprit in our flawed psychology. 
In contrast to Hume, Stanley is interested primarily not in flawed 
psychologies, but in flawed social structures that give raise to ideo-
logical beliefs. Thus, he sees ideological beliefs as connected to social 
identities, having the role of legitimating them. Social identities are 
“constituted by the practices and habits in which we engage; those 
we engage with are our community” (2015: 185). Thus, following 
Haslanger 2012b, Stanley sees ideologies as social scripts that gov-
ern one’s normative and practical expectations. This aspect explains 
why ideological beliefs are so hard to abandon or rationally revise: 
they are “cherished beliefs” (a notion introduced by Stebbing 1939) 
and contain “stereotypes’ (in Walter Lippmann’s sense, described at 
length in Lippmann 2010). This way of understanding ideological 
beliefs allows Stanley to oppose drawing an ontological distinction 
between beliefs that are rationally revisable and those that are not 
(as that proposed by Tamar Gendler with the introduction of a new 
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mental category designated by the term “alief ” in Gendler 2008). 
The final claim in this chain of reasoning is that flawed ideological 
beliefs are not only morally and politically wrong, but in addition 
have a characteristic epistemological defect which is more fundamen-
tal, in that their moral and political flaws are a consequence of the 
epistemological one: namely, they “prevent us from gaining knowl-
edge about features of reality, including social reality” (2015: 198). 
Since some of these features are the domain of democratic policy, 
flawed ideological beliefs crucially affect democratic decision mak-
ing. Stanley shows further that not only beliefs can impede us from 
gaining social knowledge, but also conceptual schemes (relying on an 
example discussed by Iris Murdoch in Murdoch 1970) and concepts 
(using Sojourner Truth’s analysis of the concept “woman”, discussed 
in Collins 2000, and cases of “hermeneutical injustice” put forward 
by Fricker 2007). Importantly, Stanley reviews a wide range of re-
cent empirical evidence to the effect that our beliefs—including 
our perceptual beliefs, which we might think are the golden gateway 
to a mind-independent reality—are tainted by background biases 
(Susanna Siegel’s term “perceptual farce” from Siegel 2014 is most 
apt here), including those regarding structural facts about society. 
The final part of the chapter is dedicated to responding to the objec-
tion that an account of ideology and propaganda is itself ideological. 
While admitting that this might influence the choice of examples 
and their political significance, Stanley finds no reason to question 
the objectivity of his account, as it builds on ordinary elements found 
in the philosophy of language, epistemology and social psychology.
Chapter 6, entitled “Political Ideologies”, connects issues from the 
previous chapter to the thread left open in chapter 3, where the focus 
of investigation was propaganda in liberal democracies. Specifically, 
Stanley is here interested in certain flawed ideologies that arise in so-
cieties with an unjust distribution of resources and in explaining how 
they are pernicious for democracy. Even more specifically, the flawed 
ideology under examination is that the positively privileged “will be-
lieve they deserve the privileges they obtain as a result of accidental 
forces” (2015: 225)—a claim forcefully made, for example, by the 
sociologist Max Weber (1967). Members of such groups develop “le-
gitimizing myths”, evidence for which comes from the self-affirmation 
theory (proposed by the psychologist Claude Steele in Steele 1988) 
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and from various studies about the political leanings of the wealthy or 
of lottery winners. Another source of such a flawed ideology is ideo-
logical uniformity, as the literature on “motivated reasoning” shows.
A crucial issue that the chapter tackles is why flawed ideologies 
of the kind mentioned are embraced not only by the positively privi-
leged, but by those negatively privileged as well (also a claim made 
by Weber 1967). Stanley argues at length for the claim that this is 
indeed so, mainly by responding to two possible objections: namely, 
that by buying into the ideology of the elites, the negatively privi-
leged act against their own interests and that the negatively privi-
leged have plenty of evidence of the social realities that contradict the 
ideology. Stanley’s strategy in responding to these worries is, again, 
a closer look at the process of belief formation. Thus, he points out 
the role of the school system and of the media as “ideological state 
apparatuses”, brings in more empirical evidence (this time about the 
phenomenon of “stereotype threat”) and describes the mechanism 
of trusting “experts” on moral issues (insights into which have been 
provided by the famous experiments done by Stanley Milgram—see, 
e.g., Milgram 1965). Another source of support for the claim comes 
from analytic epistemology. In previous work, Stanley has defended 
what is known as the “interest-relativity of knowledge”—the thesis 
that those in high-stakes situations need a higher threshold of evi-
dence for their beliefs to count as knowledge than those in low-stakes 
situations. Stanley claims that this thesis can help show why the nega-
tively privileged are epistemically oppressed (in the sense of the phrase 
theorized by Kristie Dotson in Dotson 2012). Under the reasonable 
assumption that those negatively privileged are in high-stakes situa-
tions, it follows that they have harder access to knowledge, and, given 
the connection between knowledge and action, that they are prevent-
ed from rationally choosing their actions. Moreover, given the con-
nection between knowledge and assertion, they are also at a loss in 
democratic deliberation. However, Stanley argues that one need not 
accept his thesis to hold that the negatively privileged are epistemi-
cally oppressed: the same conclusion holds under three alternative 
explanations of the data (the thesis that it is belief, not knowledge, for 
which the threshold is higher in high-stakes situations, the thesis that 
confidence is shaken by stress in high-stakes situations and the thesis 
that high-stakes situations increase reasonableness, but those in them 
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are perceived as subject to “wishful thinking”). Finally, Stanley also 
holds that flawed ideologies formed in conditions of inequality harm 
not only the negatively privileged, but also the positively privileged, 
by denying them access to knowledge of social facts, by robbing them 
of autonomous action and by making them act against their own ethi-
cal interests. “Inequality”, Stanley concludes, “is epistemologically 
problematic for everyone” (2015: 266).
Maria Cristina Amoretti’s contribution to the symposium, “Flawed 
Ideologies, Propaganda and the Social Situatedness of Knowledge”, 
addresses issues from the two chapters just summarized. More pre-
cisely, she focuses on the relation between Stanley’s take on flawed 
ideologies and propaganda, on the one hand, and the thesis of the 
social situatedness of knowledge (a thesis developed mostly within 
feminist epistemology), on the other. Thus, Amoretti explores how 
well some of Stanley’s claims fit with the tenets of standpoint theory 
and with those of social empiricism, respectively, and claims that, 
while they undermine the former, they support the latter. By relying 
on Stanley’s claims about the epistemological situation of individuals 
from both positively and negatively privileged groups caught in the 
grip of flawed ideologies, Amoretti concludes that the project in How 
Propaganda Works can help develop the broad idea of the social situat-
edness of knowledge along social empiricist lines.
Finally, chapter 7 (“The Ideology of the Elites: A Case Study”) 
is—as its name suggests—a case study meant to illustrate the main 
idea of the book, namely that elites adopt flawed ideologies in order 
to justify the excessive control they have over the goods of the society 
in which they are born. Thus, Stanley focuses on a particular histori-
cal example: the reorganization of the secondary school system at the 
beginning of the twentieth century in the United States of America. 
He connects the specific proposals to an entrenched distinction in Eu-
ropean culture: that between manual and intellectual labor, mere prac-
tical skill and theoretical knowledge. He also considers contemporary 
defenses of this idea in neuroscience which, by relying on his own 
previous work, he rejects. Stanley then shows how, by focusing on the 
ideal of social efficiency instead of that of liberty, the pedagogues at the 
beginning of the twentieth century have managed to distort the mean-
ing of democracy and impose a school system that favors theoretical 
knowledge over skill, thus heralding elites as those guiding society as a 
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whole. By showing how the educational system can be used to enforce 
social control, Stanley supports his conclusion that experts, although 
essential in a society, cannot be left to dictate matters of value.
In the short conclusion of the book, Stanley describes it as being 
“in the service of warning of false hope of realized ideals” (2015: 
292). The warning is that, by assimilating the results of progressive 
social movements in a rhetoric of progress, the gap between ideal and 
reality is obscured. Philosophy can also contribute to this by not ad-
dressing the respective gaps. In liberal democracies, the role of mask-
ing actual inequalities is played precisely by propaganda, which shows 
why its study is crucial for the good functioning of a democracy.
Although this symposium comes late to the table, the contribu-
tions within it both tackle issues that continue those already present 
in the vast discussion that How Propaganda Works has sparked and open 
up new avenues for debate—thus confirming the book’s usefulness 
for the study of propaganda and for the field of analytic philosophy in 
general. As someone interested in such issues, I am grateful for the 
opportunity of helping continue the conversation. I wholeheartedly 
thank the participants, the reviewers, the editors1 of Disputatio and, 
of course, Jason Stanley, who has not given up on this project during 
the troubled times we are currently living in.
Dan Zeman
University of Vienna
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